Yes, West Virginia, There Is a Special Priority for the Purchase Money Mortgage: The Recognition of Purchase Money Mortgage Priority in West Virginia by Ashton, Abraham M.
Volume 107 Issue 2 Article 8 
January 2005 
Yes, West Virginia, There Is a Special Priority for the Purchase 
Money Mortgage: The Recognition of Purchase Money Mortgage 
Priority in West Virginia 
Abraham M. Ashton 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abraham M. Ashton, Yes, West Virginia, There Is a Special Priority for the Purchase Money Mortgage: The 
Recognition of Purchase Money Mortgage Priority in West Virginia, 107 W. Va. L. Rev. (2005). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/8 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
"YES, WEST VIRGINIA, THERE IS A SPECIAL
PRIORITY FOR THE PURCHASE MONEY
MORTGAGE:" THE RECOGNITION OF PURCHASE
MONEY MORTGAGE PRIORITY IN WEST VIRGINIA
I. INTRODU CTION ................................................................................ 525
II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE ........ 529
III. WEST VIRGINIA'S ADHERENCE TO THE COMMON LAW ................... 534
A. The Common Law of Virginia ............................................. 535
B. The Virginia Recording Statutes ......................................... 537
C. West Virginia and the Doctrine of
Instantaneous Seisin ....................................................... 538
D. A Modern Approach to Purchase Money
M ortgage P riority ............................................................... 540
E. The Michigan Supreme Court: An Attempt to
Reject Purchase Money Mortgage Priority ......................... 542
IV. FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIENS AND PURCHASE
M ONEY M ORTGAGE PRIORITY ........................................................ 545
V. WEST VIRGINIA STATE INCOME TAX LIENS AND
PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE PRIORITY ....................................... 549
V I. C ONCLU SION ................................................................................... 550
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of a title examination is to discover and review those
documents to which the substantial body of real property law may be relevant.I
In West Virginia, most title insurance companies and lending institutions require
a sixty-year examination of the records to ensure that previous owners of real
property have not encumbered that property and that the current owner is vested
with marketable title.3 Using this title examination, financial lending institu-
tions ("lenders") require purchasers to give the lender a mortgage or deed of
I See John W. Fisher II, The Scope of Title Examination In West Virginia: Can Reasonable
Minds Differ?, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 449, 452 (1996).
2 A longer period is often required for commercial transactions. See id.
3 See id. at 474.
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trust on the real property that is being acquired via the loan to secure that loan.
The expectation of the lender is that it will have first lien priority should the
purchaser default on the loan.
4
However, during the course of a title examination, a purchaser does not
hold legal title to the real property being purchased. Thus, many practitioners do
not examine the records for encumbrances, such as judgment liens against a
purchaser, that may attach to that purchaser's interest in real property upon ac-
quisition of that property.5 One aspect of a judgment lien is that it attaches not
only to real property the debtor owns at the time the judgment is rendered, but
also to subsequent property the debtor may obtain. Assuming a judgment
against a purchaser has been properly recorded, any property that purchaser sub-
sequently acquires legal title to instantly becomes encumbered by that judgment
lien.7 Moreover, actual knowledge of the judgment lien is not required, as a
valid, properly recorded judgment lien provides lenders with constructive notice
of the lien.
8
Garrett Tire Center v. Herbaugh9 illustrates the potential problem. In
Herbaugh, the tire center obtained a judgment against Herbaugh on April 26,
1984.10 The tire center's attempts to satisfy the judgment were unsuccessful
because no assets could be located. Subsequent to the judgment, Herbaugh
purchased property and contemporaneously gave a purchase money mortgage to
Farmers and Merchants Bank, which was recorded on January 30, 1985. 2 The
bank eventually instituted a foreclosure proceeding, and the tire center inter-
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.2 (1997).
5 The author has derived this statement from conversations with practicing attorneys and law
professors.
6 See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6 (2004). The pertinent language states that "[e]very judgment for
money rendered in this State, other than by confession in vacation, shall be a lien on all the real
estate of or to which the defendant in such judgment is or becomes possessed or entitled." Id. See
also Smith v. Davis, 76 S.E. 670, 672 (W. Va. 1912) (stating that a judgment lien "constitutes a
legal lien upon.., real estate owned at the date of the judgment or afterwards acquired.").
7 See W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6. It is assumed for this discussion that a judgment lien is prop-
erly recorded per West Virginia Code section 38-3-5 (2004) and West Virginia Code section 38-3-
7 (2004). A judgment lien against the purchaser that arises before the acquisition of subsequent
real property automatically has no priority if the judgment lien has not been properly recorded to
provide notice. Id.
s See id.
9 740 S.W.2d 612 (Ark. 1987).
10 Id. at 613.
1 Id.
12 Id.
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vened, asserting its judgment lien attached before the bank's mortgage lien, and
therefore, was superior.
13
Resolving the issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the gen-
eral rule, "to which there is little dissent" that a purchase money mortgage is
entitled to preference over all claims or liens arising through the mortgagor,
even if such claims or liens are prior in time. 14 In so holding, the court found
that because the deed and mortgage are parts of one continuous transaction, "the
deed was encumbered by the purchase money mortgage at the time it was filed;"
therefore, the tire center's lien was junior to the bank's mortgage. 15
This same issue may very well find its way to the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals, however, unlike Arkansas, West Virginia is without
any guidance on the subject.' 6  Specifically, West Virginia lacks any statutory
or case law directly addressing the principle of purchase money mortgage prior-
ity.17 Therefore, the priority of purchase money mortgages in relation to other
liens and judgments is determined according to the West Virginia recording
acts,t8 and no language exists in those acts that treats purchase money mort-
gages any differently than any other mortgage or conveyance of real property.1
9
13 Id. Interestingly, one of the tire center's other arguments was that even purchase money
mortgages are not valid against a third party until recorded; thus, the tire center's judgment lien
attached during the five-minute space of time after the deed was recorded but before the recorda-
tion of the purchase money mortgage. Id. The court, however, disposed of this argument citing
that the fact the purchase money mortgage was filed five minutes after the deed was inconsequen-
tial because the deed and mortgage were part of one continuous transaction and recorded within a
reasonable time to give notice. Id. at 614.
14 Id. at 613 (citing Faulkner County Bank & Trust Co. v. Vail, 293 S.W. 40 (Ark. 1927)).
is Id. at 614.
16 In Herbaugh, the Arkansas Supreme Court derived its ruling from the 1927 case of Faulk-
ner County Bank & Trust Co. v. Vail, 293 S.W. 40 (Ark. 1927).
17 Interestingly, West Virginia, like all fifty states, does recognize the priority of purchase
money security interests (PMSI) through the Uniform Commercial Code. See W. VA. CODE § 46-
9-324 (2004).
1s "The recording acts identify those instruments which must be recorded in order to be valid
against certain 'types' of persons or entities. Fisher, supra note 1, at 456.
19 The West Virginia recording acts pertaining to real property are West Virginia Code sec-
tions 40-1-8 and 9 (2004). Section 40-1-8 applies to contracts involving the sale or lease of cer-
tain interests in real property, and therefore, is not relevant to this discussion. Fisher, supra note
1, at 459-60. Section 40-1-9, however, applies to every conveyance of real property and reads as
follows:
Every such contract, every deed conveying any such estate or term, and every
deed of gift, or trust deed or mortgage, conveying real estate shall be void, as
to creditors, and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without no-
tice, until and except from the time that it is duly admitted to record in the
county wherein the property embraced in such contract, deed, trust deed or
mortgage may be.
Id. See also W. VA CODE § 38-3-7 (2004). The pertinent phrase is as follows:
2005]
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Under section 40-1-9, West Virginia is a pure "notice" jurisdiction as to subse-
quent purchasers for value without notice, and a "race" jurisdiction as to credi-
tors. The distinction between the two is that in a notice jurisdiction "the sub-
sequent purchaser's rights are determined at the time of the 'conveyance trans-
action' based on notice or the lack thereof."2 1 Thus, unlike a "race" jurisdiction,
in a "notice" jurisdiction whether the prior grantee or the subsequent grantee
records first is not material; what matters is whether the subsequent purchaser
had notice of the previous conveyance.
22
Moreover, West Virginia courts have long held that a mortgagee or
third-party lender is considered a "purchaser" under the West Virginia recording
statutes.23  Regarding judgments, a "judgment does not constitute a lien as
against a 'purchaser of real estate for valuable consideration without notice,
unless it' is docketed in accordance with [West Virginia Code] 38-3-5.',24
To illustrate, suppose C obtains a judgment against A and properly re-
cords. Subsequently, A purchases property from S and simultaneously gives B a
mortgage for the purchase money. In a "notice" jurisdiction, because C's judg-
ment was recorded before B's mortgage, B had constructive notice of C's lien,
and therefore, was not "without notice." Because judgment liens attach to sub-
sequent property a debtor may obtain, 25 and no exception exists providing spe-
No judgment shall be a lien as against a purchaser of real estate for valuable
consideration without notice, unless it be docketed according to the fifth sec-
tion of this article, in the county wherein such real estate is, before a deed
therefor to such purchaser is delivered for record to the clerk of the county
court of such county.
Id.
20 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never used the terms "notice" or "race" to
describe this statute, however, its decisions clearly indicate that West Virginia is "notice" as to
purchasers and "race" as to creditors. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 462; see also Clyde L. Colson,
Limits of Title Search Under the West Virginia Recording Act, 56 W. VA. L. REv. 20, 24 (1954)
(the former College of Law Dean writing that "priority depends not upon priority of recording but
solely upon whether the second grantee at the time he became a purchaser had actual or construc-
tive notice of the prior conveyance."). In regard to creditors, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has declared that "[iut is immaterial whether the creditor has notice or not, when the
debt was contracted. The statute declares it void as to all creditors, without discriminating as it
does in the clause touching purchasers, in respect to notice." Delaplain & Son v. Wilkinson &
Co., 17 W. Va. 242, 244, Syl. Pt. 2 (1880) (citation omitted). For an excellent and more detailed
discussion of the West Virginia recording acts, see Fisher, supra note 1, at 462-474.
21 Fisher, supra note 1, at 463.
22 Id.
23 See Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 W. Va. 829, 858 (1879) (stating that "[a] deed of trust creditor
is held to be entitled as a purchaser... [and a] mortgagee is also a purchaser"); see also Fisher,
supra note 1, at 473.
24 Fisher, supra note 1, at 470-71; see also W; VA CODE § 38-3-7 (2004).
25 See supra note 6.
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cial priority for purchase money mortgages, C's judgment lien would appear toS26
have priority over B's subsequent mortgage lien. Accordingly, whether West
Virginia would adopt purchase money priority is an unresolved issue. Even
though the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions recognize the priority,27 no
binding precedent exists in West Virginia in favor of adopting purchase money
mortgage priority; therefore, depending upon particular factual circumstances,
West Virginia courts could easily reject purchase money mortgage priority.
In order to demonstrate that purchase money mortgage priority is alive
in West Virginia, this Article identifies the legal history that links, and hopefully
binds, West Virginia to adopt purchase money mortgage priority. Part I of this
Article provides a general overview of the issue. Part II begins by defining a
purchase money mortgage, its elements, and policy explanations, followed by an
examination of West Virginia's adherence to the common law, particularly the
common law of Virginia and those common law doctrines that West Virginia
has adopted that relate to purchase money mortgage priority. Part II closes by
tying these elements and common law doctrines together to provide for purchase
money mortgage priority in West Virginia, as well as a contemporary adoption
of the priority and a brief note as to the possible consequences of a rejection of
the principle. Part III three addresses the question that once West Virginia rec-
ognizes purchase money mortgage priority, will that priority extend to previ-
ously recorded federal income tax liens? Part IV addresses the same issue as it
pertains to West Virginia state income tax liens.
II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
A "'purchase money mortgage' is a mortgage given to a vendor of the
real estate or to a third party lender to the extent that the proceeds of the loan are
used to: (1) acquire title to the real estate; or (2) construct improvements on the
real estate if the mortgage is given as part of the same transaction in which title
is acquired."
28
In the latter instance, "only that portion of the loan [proceeds] extended
for the purpose of purchasing the property and the existing improvements" are
entitled to purchase money priority. 21 Although deeds of trust, as opposed to
mortgages, are utilized in West Virginia for the purpose of obtaining a lien on,
26 Again, this article is premised on the notion that the antecedent judgment lien has been
properly recorded. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
27 See infra, notes 59-60.
28 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7.2; see also 55 AM. Jup. 2o Mortgages § 325 (2002) ("A
mortgage on land [that is] executed by a purchaser of the land contemporaneously with the...
[acquirement] of the legal title thereto, or afterwards but as a part of the same transaction, is a
purchase-money mortgage."); see, e.g., MICHIE'S JURIS. OF W. VA. & VA., Mortgages and Deeds
of Trust § 6 (2003) [hereinafter MICHIE'S].
29 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 325 (2002).
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or security interest in, land for such a transaction, 30 the security device is often
termed a mortgage.
31
Whether or not recorded, a purchase money mortgage "has priority over
any mortgage, lien, or other claim that attaches to the real estate but is created
by or arises against the purchaser-mortgagor prior to the purchaser-mortgagor's
acquisition of title to the real estate." This priority holds true "whether the
mortgagee is the vendor or a third person who furnishes the purchase price."
33
Several rationales have developed to explain purchase money priority.
The traditional explanation lies in the doctrine of instantaneous (or transitory)
seisin, which establishes that the execution of the deed and the mortgage are
simultaneous acts; and therefore, "the title to the land does not for a single mo-
ment rest in the purchaser, but merely passes through his hands, and without
stopping vests in the mortgagee, and during such instantaneous passage no lien
of any character can attach to the title." 34 Moreover, the deed and mortgage do
not need to be executed at the same moment, or even on the same day, to make
them contemporaneous, as long as "they were parts of one continuous transac-
tion, and so intended to be, so that the two instruments should be given contem-
poraneous operation in order to promote the intent of the parties."
35
To illustrate, in Holland Jones Co. v. Smith,36 a judgment had been
properly docketed against A.3 7 A then purchased a parcel of land from B, there-
after giving a deed of trust to C several months later to secure the purchase
30 See W. VA. CODE § 38-1-2 (2004) and MICHIE's, supra note 28, at § 4 (stating that in West
Virginia, the deed of trust "is the prevailing method, if not the universal practice").
31 See MICHIE'S, supra note 28. Deeds of trust and mortgages are essentially the same as both
instruments are security devices used to convey an estate, or pledge of property, as security for the
payment of money. Id. at § 3-4. The practical difference between the two instruments is the
method of foreclosure. Id. at § 7. A mortgage conveys property to be used as security for the
payment of a debt to the mortgagee and requires formal foreclosure proceedings. A deed of trust
on the other hand, conveys property to a trustee to hold as security for the payment of a debt, and
upon default by the debtor, the trustee may foreclose upon the property without application to a
court. See Firstbank Shinnston v. W. Va. Insurance Co., 408 S.E.2d 777, 781 (W. Va. 1991); and
Swann v. Young, 14 S.E. 426,430 (W. Va. 1892).
32 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7.2; see Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 259 n.23
(1978) (stating that "[d]ecisional law has long established that a purchase-money mortgagee's
interest in the mortgaged property is superior to antecedent liens prior in time."). Note however,
in order for a mortgagee to protect against subsequent interests that arise through the mortgagor
after the purchase money transaction, the purchase money mortgage must be recorded or it loses
its priority. RESTATEMENT, supra.
33 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 405 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7.2.
34 Goodman v. Riddick, 148 S.E. 695, 696 (Va. 1929).
35 Id.
36 148 S.F. 581 (Va. 1929).
37 Id. at 581.
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money. Even though C did not receive the deed of trust until several months
after the original conveyance,3 9 the determination as to whether the two transac-
tions were contemporaneous was not determined by the respective dates of the
deed of conveyance and the deed of trust, but whether or not the two instru-
ments were a part of one continuous transaction and intended to be by the par-
ties.
40
Another theory rests on the principle that the title the purchaser receives
is encumbered title, and thus, has the same status as a retained vendor's lien.
4 1
Simply stated, when a debtor obtains title to real estate, and at the same time
gives a mortgage or deed of trust to either the seller or a third-party to secure the
purchase money, a "prior judgment lien cannot attach because the purchaser
never obtains title to the land, but acquires only an equity interest subject to the
payment of the purchase money."4 2  In essence, the debtor has not "owned" the
real estate long enough to entitle his antecedent lienholder any rights to it; thus,
38 Id.
39 Id. at 582.
40 Id; see also Summers v. Dame, 31 Gratt. 791, 801 (Va. 1879). The pertinent language
reads:
When, therefore, land is conveyed and the purchaser at the same time gives
back a mortgage or other encumbrance to secure the purchase-money, he does
not thereby acquire any such seisin or interest as will entitle his wife to dower,
or his creditor to subject the land to his debts discharged of the mortgage. In
such cases the deed and the mortgage are regarded as parts of the same con-
tract, and constitute but a single transaction, investing the purchaser with sei-
sin for a transitory instant only.
Id.
41 Guffey v. Creutzinger, 984 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tenn. 1998). This rational for the purchase
money mortgage priority, however, is slightly more difficult to apply to third-party lenders, al-
though it is advanced in such cases. It is advanced by analogy
that the purchase money mortgage always takes the place of an equitable in-
terest in the property that precedes any lien or interest of any kind attaching to
the purchaser's estate at the time of acquiring title. Where there is a prior con-
tract of sale, this equitable interest consists of a specifically enforceable con-
tract right to have the purchase money mortgage given on taking title and the
equitable estate under the purchase contract is subject to this right. Where
there is no prior contract the vendor retains on conveying title without receiv-
ing payment an equitable vendor's lien. When the purchase money mortgage
is given it merely replaces and takes the priority of one or the other of these
prior equities, and this is so whether it is given at once or subsequently, pro-
vided it is part of the same transaction. The third party lender of the purchase
money is simply an extension of this [principle].
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7.2 (quoting 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §
901 (3d ed. 1993)).
42 Guffey, 984 S.W.2d at 222.
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where no statutory enactment intervenes, "the judgment creditor can acquire no
better right to his debtor's estate than the latter himself has."
43
Moreover, when conflicting claims arise between a purchase money
mortgage and an antecedent judgment lien, a more modem explanation support-
ing purchase money priority is premised on intrinsic fairness.4 Pragmatically,
lenders loan money with the expectation that they will have a lien on or security
interest in the real estate being acquired; therefore, but for the loan, the pur-
chaser-mortgagor would have never received the property.4 5  This "long-
established" rule makes it unnecessary for purchase-money lenders to search for
preexisting judgments, thereby reducing title risk in such transactions and en-• • 46
couraging purchase money financing.
Additionally, "judgment lien creditors have not extended their credit in
reliance on the right to be repaid out of any specific property." 4 7 Thus, the
judgment creditor has not relied on. a purchaser's acquisition of propetsy be-
cause the judgment was entered before the property at issue was acquired.
Purchase money priority also prevents lending institutions from having
to pay antecedent judgments to protect their interests. In Nelson v. Stoker,4 9 the
issue revolved around whether the State of Utah's judgment lien against the
mortgagor for unpaid child support had priority over a vendor's purchase money
mortgage lien that was recorded after the State's judgment lien had been re-
corded. To reconcile the dispute, the Supreme Court of Utah recognized that
the "overwhelming weight of authority recognizes the special priority accorded
a vendor's purchase money mortgage" 5 1 and held that the State's judgment lien
was like any ordinary judgment lien,52 and therefore, not superior to the ven-
dor's purchase money mortgage. 53 Although the case directly addressed pur-
43 Holland, 148 S.E. at 582; see also Summers, 31 Gratt. at 801 (stating that "[t]he creditor is
in no just sense treated as a purchaser. He has no equity whatever beyond what justly belongs to
the debtor.").
44 Guffey, 984 S.W.2d at 222.
45 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7.2.
46 Id.
47 Guffey, 948 S.W.2d at 222 (citing NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 41).
48 Id.
49 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983).
50 Id. at 392.
51 Id. at 393.
52 The State's argument centered on the Public Support for Children Act, which provided that
a'lien under this act would have the same preference against the assets of the debtor as claims for
taxes. Id. at 395. The Court noted that not all tax liens have special priority and refused to give
the State's lien under this act any extraordinary priority. Id.
53 Id. at 395-96.
[V61. 107
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/8
20051 PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE PRIORITY
chase money priority when the vendor, and not a third-party, is the mortgagee,
the court recognized in dicta its application to lending institutions.54 Specifi-
cally, the court stated that to grant priority to the state's judgment lien, the hold-
ers of purchase money mortgages, "whether vendors or financial institutions"
would be forced "to pay the judgment in order to protect their interest and main-
tain their priority." 55 Such a holding "would force lenders" to include "due-on-
divorce" or "due-on-failure-to-pay-child-support" provisions when lending
money.56 That result, the court concluded, was not in the public's best inter-
est.
57
The rule giving priority to purchase money mortgages over outstanding
interests acquired through the mortgagor, however, has not been limited strictly
to judgment liens. It has also been applied to outstanding judgments of execu-
tion liens, welfare liens, and dower or homestead interests.
5
Most jurisdictions have adopted this long-standing common law rule, ei-
ther through statute 59 or case law. Interestingly, along with West Virginia,
only four other states do not have any case law or statute addressing the pur-
54 See id. at 396.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 55 AM. JuR. 2D Mortgages § 326 (2002).
59 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-705 (Michie 2000); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2898 (West 2000);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 2108 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-104 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 506-
2 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 45-112 (Michie 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-1-4 (Michie 2002);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.1213 (West 2000); KAN. STAT ANN. § 58-2305 (2002); MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 7-104 (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-45 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-114
(2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:9-8 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-03-10 (2004); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8141 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 44-2-2 (Michie 2000).
60 See Sunshine Bank v. Smith, 631 So. 2d 965, 967 (Ala. 1994); Belland v. O.K. Lumber Co.
797 P.2d 638, 641 (Alaska 1990); Garrett Tire Center v. Herbaugh, 740 S.W.2d 612 (Ark. 1987);
ALH Holding Co. v. Bank of Telluride, 18 P.3d 742, 745 (Colo. 2000); Zandri v. Tender, 4 Conn.
Supp. 125 (1936); BancFlorida v. Haywood, 689 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 1997); Hand Trading
Co. v. Daniels, 190 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga. 1972); Roane v. Baker, 11 N.E. 246, 248 (Ill. 1887);
Gully v. Ray, 57 Ky. 107, 114 (1857); Libby v. Tidden, 78 N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1906); Libby v.
Brooks, 653 A.2d 422, 424 (Me. 1995); Stewart v. Smith, 30 N.W. 430,431 (Minn. 1886); Deme-
ter v. Wilcox, 22 S.W. 613, 615 (Mo. 1893); Omaha Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, v. Turk, 21 N.W.2d
865, 867 (Neb. 1946); Davidson v. Click, 249 P. 100, 102 (N.M. 1926); Shilowitz v. Wader, 261
N.Y.S. 351, 354 (1932); Slate v. Marion, 408 S.E.2d 189, 191 (N.C. 1991); Ward v. Carey, 39
Ohio St. 361, 363 (1883); United OK Bank v. Moss, 793 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Okla. 1990); Ladd &
Tilton Bank v. Mitchell, 184 P. 282, 284 (Or. 1919); Cummings v. Consol. Mineral Water Co., 61
A. 353, 356 (R.I. 1905); DeSaussure v. Bollmann, 7 S.C. 329, 339 (1876); Guffey v. Creutzinger,
984 S.W. 2d 219, 221-22 (Tenn. 1998); Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mort. Co., 468 S.W.2d 341,
343-44 (Tex. 1971); Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 394 (Utah 1983); Goodman v. Riddick, 148
S.E. 695, 696 (Va. 1929); Bisbee v. Carey, 49 P. 220 (Wash. 1897); N. State Bank v. Toal, 230
N.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Wis. 1975); Van Patten v. Van Patten, 784 P.2d 218, 220-21 (Wyo. 1989).
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chase money mortgage, 61 and one state recently had the purchase money priority
issue before its supreme court. 62
III. WEST VIRGINIA'S ADHERENCE To THE COMMON LAW
Unless altered by statute, West Virginia has adopted the rules of the
common law.63 The common law in effect in West Virginia is the traditional
English common law, unless amended by Virginia, in which case the common
law would reflect the laws of Virginia prior to 1863. 64  In TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., TXO brought a frivolous lawsuit against
Alliance allegedly to clear a purported cloud on the title to an oil and gas
65lease. Alliance filed a counterclaim alleging that TXO's actions amounted to
a "slander of [Alliance's] title,' 66 even though no West Virginia case law ex-
isted recognizing an action for slander of title.67 The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals examined both the West Virginia Constitution and the West
Virginia Code to conclude that the court must look to the common law of Vir-
ginia as of 1863. Thereafter, the court found that slander of title had long been
recognized as a common law cause of action, 69 and therefore, "could always be
61 The author was unable to locate any purchase money mortgage priority law for: Louisiana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
62 A recent decision by the Michigan Supreme Court held that Michigan law does not pro-
vide for purchase money mortgage priority. That decision has been vacated and a more detailed
discussion of the events of that case are discussed infra, Part lII. E. See Graves v. Am. Accep-
tance Mortg. Co. 652 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2002), vacated, 658 N.W.2d 482 (2003).
63 See W. VA. CONSTITUTION Art. VIII § 13 (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this article, such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in force on the effec-
tive date of this article and are not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of this State
until altered or repealed by the legislature."); W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (2004) (which states that the
"common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principles of the constitution of this
state, shall continue in force ... [unless it has been] altered by the general assembly of Virginia
before the twentieth day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, or has been, or shall be, altered
by the Legislature of this state"); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 878
(W. Va. 1992) (Justice Neely writing that "the West Virginia Constitution commands that we
recognize the English common law as of 1863.").
64 TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 878 n.4. For a good discussion of the history of the common law in
West Virginia, see James Audley McLaughlin, The Idea of the Common Law in West Virginia
Jurisprudential History: Morningstar v. Black & Decker Revisited, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 125
(2000).
65 Id. at 875.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 878.
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. ,.. ,70brought in West Virginia. Based on this interpretation, West Virginia is
bound by its Constitution, Code, and case law to adopt the common law as it
existed prior to 1863.71 Therefore, the priority of the purchase money mortgage
must be examined as it existed in Virginia in 1863.
A. The Common Law of Virginia
The Commonwealth of Virginia has never statutorily given priority to
the purchase money mortgage; its case law however, reveals its adherence to
this equitable principle.
The starting point in this analysis lies in the doctrine of instantaneous
seisin.72 In Gilliam v. Moore,73 Gilliam conveyed a tract of land to Moore.
74
On the same day, Moore gave a deed to trustees to secure the purchase money
due to Gilliam.75  Later, the trustees sold the property pursuant to the trust
deed.76 At that sale, Gilliam purchased the property; however, before he was
able to take possession, Moore died and his widow claimed she was entitled to
her dower in the land.
77
In holding that Moore's wife was not dowable, the Supreme Court of
Virginia stated that "the two instruments were parts of one and the same transac-
tion, and that the seizin of Moore was that instantaneous seizin... where the land
was merely in transitu, and never vested in the husband." 78 The court went on
to say that, although it could find no cases directly on point, "[t]he english books
[ ] all lay down the position that a transitory seizin in the husband for an instant,
does not entitle the wife to dower, and the point has been decided in the same
way, in Massachusetts and New York."' 79 Additional cases followed concerning
a wife's claim of dower, and in all instances, the seisin in the husband was held
to be transitory only, thus depriving the wife of dower. 80
70 Id. at 879.
71 However, a common law decision, like any other decision, is subject to reconsideration and
may be overruled if it is found to be wrong. Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 851 (W.
Va. 1975).
72 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
73 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 30 (1832).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 32.
79 Id.
80 See Wilson v. Davisson, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 384 (1843); and Wheatley v. Calhoun, 39 Va. (12
Leigh) 264 (1841).
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The Virginia Supreme Court expanded the doctrine in Summers v.
Dame.8 1 In defining the rights of creditors, the court stated that a creditor is not
a purchaser and, in the absence of a statute, a "judgment creditor can acquire no
better right to his debtor's estate than the latter himself has."'82 Thus, a court
will "limit the lien of the judgment to the actual interest the debtor has;" the
creditor is not entitled to any equity beyond what justly belongs to the debtor.83
Applying the above principle to a conveyance of land where the pur-
chaser gave back a mortgage to secure the purchase money, the court stated that
the purchaser did not acquire any seisin or interest that would entitle his wife to
dower, "or his creditor to subject the land to his debts discharged of the mort-
gage."' 4 In such cases, the purchaser's seisin is transitory only.85
In a complete adoption and recognition of the principle, Cowardin v.
Anderson,86 citing Chancellor Kent's Commentaries, stated that:
In one instance a mortgage will have a preference over a prior
docketed judgment, and that is the case of a sale and convey-
ance of land, and a mortgage taken at the same time in return to
secure the payment of the purchase money. The deed and the
mortgage are considered as parts of the same contract, and con-
stituting one act; and justice and policy equally require that no
prior judgment against the mortgagor should intervene and at-
tach upon the land during the transitory seisin to the prejudice
of the mortgage .... And it applies equally in favor of a third
person, who advances the purchase money, and at the time of
the conveyance, takes a mortgage on the land for his indem-
nity.
87
Abiding by that language, Virginia courts have continually applied this princi-
ple.88 Moreover, even though the express written acceptance of the principledid not occur in Virginia until after 1863, the Virginia courts derived each deci-
81 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 791 (1879).
82 Id. at 800.
83 Id. at 800-01.
94 Id. at 801.
85 Id.
86 78 Va. 88 (1883).
87 Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added).
88 See Holland Jones Co. v. Smith, 148 S.E. 581, 582-83 (Va. 1929); Goodman v. Riddick,
148 S.E. 695, 696 (Va. 1929); Moomaw v. Jordan, 87 S.E. 569, 570 (Va. 1916); Charlottesville
Hardware Co. v. Perkins, 86 S.E. 869, 871 (Va. 1915); and Straus v. Bodeker's Ex'x, 10 S.E. 570,
575 (Va. 1889).
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sion from the common law rules of England. Specifically, the great legal schol-
ars of the English common law, such as Blackstone, Black, and Freeman, clearly
recognized the priority of the purchase money mortgage over all other liens aris-
ing through the mortgagor.8 9 Historically, then, the common law of Virginia
and England each recognized the priority of the purchase money mortgage over
antecedent judgments arising through the mortgagor.
B. The Virginia Recording Statutes
When West Virginia became a state in 1863, it codified many of its par-
ent state's statutes. In fact, West Virginia's recording statutes are based upon a
Virginia statute in force when West Virginia became a state, and were subse-
quently carried into the West Virginia Code, effective 1869.90
89 See A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 974 (Edward W. Tuttle ed.,
5th ed. 1925). Freeman wrote:
No doubt one against whom a judgment has already been docketed may pur-
chase land, and at the same time he receives his conveyance may give, to se-
cure any portion of the purchase money, a mortgage or trust deed, which will
take precedence over the judgment as a lien on the lands purchased, whether
the mortgage or trust deed be given to the vendor or to a third person who ad-
vances the money This reason is readily found when we remember that it is a
universally recognized principle of law that no judgment lien can be a charge
upon any greater interest than the defendant owns. A judgment against such a
vendee must therefore be subordinate as a lien to that held by the vendor; and
for this purpose it is perfectly immaterial whether the claim is put in the shape
of a vendor's lien or of a mortgage to secure the payment of purchase money.
See also HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS, § 447 (2d ed. 1902).
Black agreed, stating that:
A mortgage or trust-deed given to secure the balance of purchase-money on a
tract of land, executed simultaneously with the conveyance of the legal title
and duly recorded, has priority of lien over judgments obtained against the
purchaser anterior to the conveyance. In such case, the purchaser acquires
only a temporary seisin, and not such an interest in the land as becomes sub-
ject to the lien of a judgment against him in preference to the mortgage, as the
deed and the mortgage are but parts of the same transaction. And where the
purchaser, at the same time he receives the conveyance, executes a mortgage
to a third person, who advances the purchase-money for him, such mortgage
is entitled to the same preference over a prior judgment as it would have had if
it had been executed to the vendor himself.
Black further recognized that the execution of a mortgage for some distinct debt or liability, and
not to secure the purchase money of the land, was not a purchase money mortgage, thus the judg-
ment will be the superior lien. Id. See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND, RIGHTS OF THINGS, (Gavitt ed., Wash. Law Book Co. 1892) (saying "[t]he
seisin of the husband for a transitory instant only, when the same act which conveys him the prop-
erty conveys it again, will not entitle the wife to dower, for the lands were merely in trasitu, and
never vested in the husband.").
90 Pack v. Hansbarger, 17 W. Va. 313 (1880); see also Fisher, supra note 1.
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Thus, Virginia, at the time West Virginia became a state, was a notice
jurisdiction as to subsequent purchasers for value without notice: "All bargains,
sales and conveyances, whatever, of any lands ... ; and all deeds of trust and
mortgages whatsoever.., shall be void, as to all creditors and subsequent pur-
chasers for valuable consideration without notice,"' unless properly recorded.9 1
Additionally, West Virginia's statute regarding judgment liens is taken from the
Code of Virginia of 1849: "No judgment shall be a lien on real estate as against
a purchaser thereof for valuable consideration without notice," unless properly
recorded.
92
A literal reading of the Virginia statutes does not grant any special pri-
ority for mortgages given to secure purchase money. Subsequent purchasers are
only protected to the extent such purchasers did not have notice of the antece-
dent interest, which leads to the conclusion that a properly recorded judgment
lien should have priority over a subsequently recorded purchase money mort-
gage.
Nevertheless, as discussed supra, this was not the rule of law in Vir-
ginia.93 In spite of no specific mention of purchase money priority in its stat-
utes, Virginia has continually extended purchase money priority. 94 Similarly,
West Virginia's recording statutes do not explicitly mention purchase money
priority. 95 Nonetheless, because the common law doctrine granting special pri-
ority to purchase money mortgages was alive in Virginia despite the express
absence of any statutory priority, West Virginia's codification of the Virginia
recording statutes, and Virginia court interpretations as to those statutes, pro-
vides precedent for purchase money mortgage priority to apply in West Vir-
ginia.
C. West Virginia and the Doctrine of Instantaneous Seisin
Although no West Virginia case law exists specifically concerning pur-
chase money priority, several cases exist that resemble the early Virginia cases
relating to dower.96 In Roush v. Miller97 the plaintiff widow brought suit claim-
ing she was entitled to dower in a tract of land that her deceased husband had
91 Pack, 17 W. Va. at 322 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 324-25.
93 See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
97 20 S.E. 663 (W. Va. 1894).
[Vol. 107
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/8
PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE PRIORITY
mortgaged to defendant Miller to secure the purchase price.98 In holding that
the wife was not dowable in the property, the court stated:
[b]ut it has always been held that where the land is conveyed to
the husband, and he, by deed of the same date, conveys the land
to a trustee, in trust to secure the purchase-money, the two con-
veyances are parts of one and the same transaction, and, the sei-
sin of the husband being instantaneous and transitory, the
widow to that extent is not entitled to dower.
99
Furthermore, in its examination of the issue, Roush refers to the holding in
Cowardin00 that applied purchase money mortgage priority over previously
recorded judgment liens arising through the mortgagor, whether or not the
holder of the mortgage was the vendor or a third party. The court stated that,
although Cowardin was not a case involving the right of dower, "[it saw] no
reason why the same principle should not be applied in such cases."102 Addi-
tionally, several other West Virginia cases have applied instantaneous seisin as a
bar to dower in property mortgaged to secure the purchase money.l13
Moreover, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals agrees that a
creditor can have no better right to a debtor's property than what the debtor has.
In Smith v. Gott"' the court stated:
It is well-settled law in this state that a judgment creditor can
acquire no better right to the estate of the debtor than the debtor
himself has when the judgment is recovered. He takes it subject
to every liability under which the debtor held it, and subject to
all the equities which existed in favor of third parties, and a
98 Id. at 664.
99 Id. (citing Gilliam v. Moore, 31 Va. 30 (1832)).
100 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
101 Roush, 20 S.E.2d at 664.
102 Id. Cowardin also held that a purchaser who, contemporaneously with the conveyance of
the property, executes a trust deed of the same, has only a temporary seisin, not subject to judg-
ment and that the interest of the judgment creditor is limited to the debtor's interest in the land
sought to be subjected; therefore, he is not a purchaser, and has no equity beyond what belongs to
the debtor. Cowardin v. Anderson, 78 Va. 88 (1883).
103 See Martin v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 579 (1885); Holden v. Boggess, 20 W, Va. 62 (1882);
Hunter v. Hunter, 10 W. Va. 321 (1877); and Sinnett v. Cralle, 4 W. Va. 600 (1871).
104 41 S.E. 175 (W. Va. 1902).
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court of equity will limit the lien of the judgment to the actual
interest which the debtor has in the estate. 
10 5
Based on these principles, when the conveyance and mortgage are contempora-
neous, the purchaser-debtor has no interest in the property that would subject the
property to his judgment creditor. 106 Accordingly, even though West Virginia
has not specifically recognized purchase money mortgage priority, the above
cases clearly recognize the common law policy explanations that help to form
purchase money priority. Combining those holdings with Virginia common law
and the persuasive nature of the law of the majority of other jurisdictions pro-
vides West Virginia with the necessary fundamental precedent to rightfully
adopt the priority of the purchase money mortgage over all antecedent judgment
liens arising through the purchaser-mortgagor.
D. A Modern Approach to Purchase Money Mortgage Priority
As discovered through the research involved in this article, most juris-
dictions recognizing purchase money priority had occasion to examine the issue
early in their legal history. In the modem era, however, some jurisdictions, like
West Virginia, have not been confronted with the issue. In Tennessee for ex-
ample, a contemporary court had not addressed the issue of purchase money
mortgage priority until 1998.108
In Guffey v. Creutzinger, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the
defendants and duly recorded his judgment lien in June and July of 1995.109
Subsequently, the defendants, on November 27, 1995, purchased real property
and contemporaneously gave a deed of trust on the property to defendant First
Tennessee Bank for the purchase money."l 0 Both the deed to the property and
the bank's deed of trust were recorded two days later."
11
The plaintiff, in an attempt to recover his judgments, brought suit assert-
ing that his judgment liens had priority because they were recorded before the
bank's deed of trust.112 The bank on the other hand, asserted it had priority be-
105 Id. at 177. This theory resembles the explanation for the rule as discussed supra, notes 41-
43.
106 See supra, notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
107 See supra, notes 59-60.
10 See Guffey v. Creutzinger, 984 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
ID9 Id. at 220.
110 Id.
III Id.
112 Id. at 221. Plaintiff's argument centered on TENN. CODE. ANN. § 66-24-119 (1993), which
stated that judgment liens attach to subsequently acquired property by the debtor if a proper ab-
stract of judgment is filed. Id. Thus, because his lien was filed first, the defendants had construc-
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cause its loan was in the form of a purchase money mortgage and the funds were
used accordingly. 113 The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank,
agreeing that its deed of trust had priority. 114
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals recognized the issue had not
appeared in Tennessee during the modem era.F,5 The court first examined vari-
ous sources all advancing purchase money priority. 116 Next, the court looked at
Tennessee case law that gave a vendor's purchase money mortgage priority over
an antecedent mechanic's lien,117 and case law analogizing the contemporane-
ous element of purchase money mortgages relating to claims by antecedent
judgment lien holders. 118
Combining the above authorities and applying them to the facts before
it, the court held that Tennessee recognizes the "special nature of purchase
money mortgages" and found the title conveyed to the defendant-mortgagors
was encumbered when conveyed; therefore, the plaintiff's judgment lien did not
have priority over the bank's purchase money mortgage lien.
Guffey illustrates that modem courts facing the issue of purchase money
priority will extend the rule granting a purchase money mortgage priority over a
previously recorded judgment lien against the mortgagor. Like West Virginia,
Tennessee had already adopted some of the fundamental elements that form
purchase money priority. 12  The Tennessee Court of Appeals also looked at
decisions of other courts, the thoughts of legal scholars, and the policy explana-
tive notice of the judgment; therefore, plaintiff's judgment lien took priority because it was re-
corded first.
113 Id. Despite the statute, the bank pointed out the "oneness" of the transaction and argued
that the defendant-mortgagors had acquired encumbered title; thus, the judgment lien could not
have attached in front of the purchase money deed of trust.
114 Id.
115 Id at 222.
116 Id. at 221-22. The court cited various secondary legal authorities, as well as cases from
other jurisdictions. The court also looked at policy reasons that are the foundation for purchase
money priority that this article has discussed supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
117 Id. at 222-23. The court cited Prichard Bros. v. Causey, 12 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. 1929).
1IN Id. at 223-24. The court cited Bridges v. Cooper, 39 S.W. 720 (Tenn. 1897). The court
noted that Bridges gave the judgment lien creditor priority because the deed and mortgage did not
take effect at the same time. Id. Had the deed and mortgage been "parts of a single transaction"
the outcome would have been reversed. Id. See Bridges, 39 S.W. at 722.
119 Id. at 224. Interestingly, the court did note that the "one continuous transaction" theory is a
legal fiction, but equity supports it, in part because the defendant-mortgagors did not have any
interest in the subject property when the plaintiff's lien was filed; therefore, the plaintiff cannot
rely on a detrimental reliance remedy. Id.
120 See Guffey, 984 S.E.2d 219.
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tions advancing the priority. 121 Given this modem adoption of purchase money
priority, as well as West Virginia's adoption of the common law when its stat-
utes are silent, little authority exists for West Virginia courts to reject purchase
money mortgage priority.
E. The Michigan Supreme Court: An Attempt to Reject Purchase Money
Mortgage Priority
Should the issue of purchase money mortgage priority present itself to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the court should find that such
mortgages are not entitled to priority over antecedent judgment liens arising
through the mortgagor, a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan
is an example of the possible confusion that may arise. In Graves v, American
Acceptance Mortgage Corp.,122 a married couple purchased, by land contract, a
home in 1987. 23 By 1994, however, the couple had divorced, and as part of the
divorce judgment, the ex-husband was awarded the couple's interest in the
property. 24 Alternately, the ex-wife was to be reimbursed $7,504 by her ex-
husband for child support, rental, and land contract payments on other property
the couple had owned. 125 As security for the payments, the ex-wife was given a
lien on the couple's former home, and recorded this lien in September of
1994.126
Ironically, on the same date the ex-wife recorded her lien, the ex-
husband mortgaged the same property that was subject to the ex-wife's lien to
American Acceptance Mortgage Co., using the proceeds of the loan to pay off
the original land contract and obtain title to the property. 27 The mortgage com-
pany recorded its lien on October 5, 1994; however, before recording, it as-
signed its interest to Boulder Escrow, Inc., which recorded its assignment on
April 13, 1995.128
Next, however, the ex-husband defaulted on the mortgage and Boulder
published a notice of a public auction on January 11, 1996. 29 The ex-wife,
however, asserting that her ex-husband had failed to perform his obligations
121 Id.
122 652 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2002) (per curiam).
123 Id. at 222.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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under the divorce agreement, sued her ex-husband, American Acceptance Mort-
gage, and Boulder to foreclose on her judgment lien. 13° Boulder then filed a
cross-claim against the ex-husband for defaulting, and a counterclaim against
the ex-wife asserting that Boulder's mortgage lien had priority over her judg-
ment lien.1
31
The lower court held in favor of the ex-wife because her lien was re-
corded first; and thus, constructive notice had been given to subsequent pur-
chasers. 13 The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, reversed, finding that the
ex-husband's mortgage was a purchase money mortgage, and therefore, it had
priority over the ex-wife's judgment lien. 133
On appeal, in a per curiam opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals and found for the ex-wife, yet left undisturbed the
Court of Appeals finding that the mortgage was a purchase money mortgage.13
4
In reversing, the Michigan Supreme Court first examined the Michigan re-
cording statutes, 135 which it determined to be "race-notice," thereby placing
instruments recorded first in priority over subsequent conveyances. 13
6
After examining the statutes, it concluded that nowhere did the statutes
"exempt purchase money mortgages from the 'first-in-time' recording prior-
ity."' 3  Thus, the Michigan "legislature has decided to afford preference to the
first-in-time recording encumbrance without giving any special preference to
purchase money mortgages," and reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals. 138
Following this decision, on a motion for rehearing, the Michigan Su-
preme Court vacated the above per curiam decision. 139 In doing so, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court granted motions by the Real Property Law Section of the
State Bar of Michigan and the Michigan Land Title Association for leave to file
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 224.
135 See MICH. COmp. LAWS §§ 565.25 and 565.29 (2002).
136 Graves, 652 N.W.2d at 223; see also First of Am. Bank v. Alt, 848 F. Supp. 1343, 1347
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (reciting that "Michigan has adopted what is frequently known as a "race-
notice" statute: the first interest holder to record takes priority, unless that individual has notice of
a prior unrecorded interest.").
137 Id.
138 Id. at 224.
139 See Graves v. Amer. Mort. Co., 658 N.W.2d 482 (2003).
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amicus briefs in the case. 14  The Michigan Association of Register of Deeds
was also invited to file such briefs.
14 1
The controversy over that holding was that the Michigan Supreme Court
did not limit the holding to the specific facts of Graves.142 The court could have
reversed the court of appeals by holding that the mortgage was not a purchase
money mortgage at all because the ex-husband already owned the property at
the time American Mortgage loaned him the money to pay off the land con-
tract, 143 however, the court did not, leaving the practitioner to wonder if the
purchase money mortgage priority principle was not applicable in Michigan. 
1
"
After the decision was vacated and leave granted for appeal, 14 5 the deci-
sion was appealed, and after hearing oral argument, 14 6 the Michigan Supreme
Court failed to clarify its position regarding the priority of purchase money
mortgages. 147 Specifically, in reinstating the trial court's judgment, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court held that the mortgage was not a purchase money mortgage
because the ex-husband already owned the property at the time he took out the
mortgage to pay off the land contract, and thus, the ex-husband's acquisition of
the property and his obligations under the mortgage to American Acceptance
were not part of the same transaction.148 Thus, because the mortgage was not a
purchase money mortgage, the ex-wife's judgment lien on the property had pri-
ority because it had been filed first.
14 9
While that part of the opinion seems correct, the Court failed to address
the priority issue. Specifically, the court held in its vacated, per curiam opinion
that "the Michigan legislature has decided to afford preference to the first-in-
time recording encumbrance without giving any special preference to purchase
money mortgages."' 150 However, by not addressing the priority issue on appeal,
still unclear is the Michigan Supreme Court's position on purchase money
mortgage priority.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 For a good discussion of the Graves case see Carl W. Herstein, 48 WAYNE L. REv. 815
(2002).
143 See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
14 See id.
145 See supra note 140.
146 See Graves v. Am. Acceptance Mort. Corp., 677 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004).
147 Id.
148 Graves, 677 N.W.2d at 834-35.
149 Id. at 618; see also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
so Graves v. Am. Acceptence Mort. Corp., 652 NW.2d 222, 224 (Mich. 2002) (per curiam).
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Interestingly, in her concurrence, Justice Weaver addresses the confu-
sion; specifically, she writes that because the Court in its per curiam opinion
held that Michigan law did not recognize purchase money priority and then va-
cated that opinion only to later hold that the mortgage at issue was not a pur-
chase money mortgage, the "Court's actions have caused confusion and instabil-
ity in the law where there was none."
151
She further writes to emphasize that the "overturning of the purchase
money mortgage doctrine in that vacated opinion has no effect or precedential
value.' 152 Nonetheless, to further muddy the water for the practitioner, the ma-
jority, in a footnote, writes that because the priority of purchase money mort-
gages is not implicated in the case, "the concurrence should not be understood
as the position of this Court."'
153
Similarly, just like Michigan's statutes do not exempt purchase money
mortgages from Michigan's recording requirements to establish priority, neither
do West Virginia's statutes. 154 However, a holding by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals that purchase money mortgage priority does not exist in
West Virginia could easily mimic the same type of confusion created by the
Michigan Supreme Court. Thus, the Graves' cases provide an illustration of the
potential confusion that rejecting purchase money mortgage priority may create,
and thus, it may serve as additional authority to support the adoption of purchase
money mortgage priority in West Virginia.
IV. FEDERAL INCOME TAx LIENS AND PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
PRIORITY
Once the purchase money mortgage has been given priority as to previ-
ously recorded judgment liens arising through the mortgagor, another question
to answer is does the priority extend to a previously recorded federal income tax
lien? A federal income tax lien is a creature of statute.15 5 The lien is not valid
against other competing interests until such lien is filed to provide proper no-
tice. 156 In the case of real property, the lien is filed and indexed according to
state law 1 7 in an office of the state where the property is located. 
158
1s1 Graves, 677 N.W.2d at 836 (Weaver. J., concurring).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 83 1, nl1.
154 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
155 See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000). If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, additional tax, or
assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, be-
longing to such person.
156 See 26 U.S.C. 6323(a) (2000). "The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as
against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's leinor, or judgment lien creditor
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The federal income tax lien, then, enjoys no priority over mortgages or
judgments that attach before the filing of the tax lien.159 Thus, no absolute pri-
ority exists for the federal tax lien; a federal tax lien that attaches after the pur-
chase money mortgage or deed of trust will be subordinate to that instrument.
160
Given that the federal income tax lien enjoys no absolute priority over
the solvent debtor, examining its priority as against a subsequently recorded
purchase money mortgage is similar to that of judgment liens discussed in Part
II above. Tax liens attach to all property, real or personal, belonging to the tax-
payer at any time during the period of the lien, including any property or rights
• • • 161
to property acquired by such person after the lien arises. If the federal tax lien
against the mortgagor attaches prior to the deed of trust for the purchase money,
does the deed of trust have priority?
At first glance, one may assume that it does not. The tax code provides
protection for certain interests even though a notice of lien has been filed pursu-
ant to 26 U.S.C § 6321.162 Specifically, the tax lien is not valid "as against a
holder of a security interest 163 in such security who, at the time such interest
came into existence, 164 did not have actual notice or knowledge 165 of the exis-
tence of such lien."
166
until notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the secre-
tary." Id.
157 See id. In West Virginia, "[nlotices of liens upon real property for obligations payable to
the United States and certificates and notices affecting the liens shall be filed in the office of the
clerk of the county commission of the county in which the real property subject to the liens is
situated." W. VA CODE § 38-1OA-2(b) (2000).
158 See 26 U.S.C. 6323(f) (2000). For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that a fed-
eral income tax lien has been properly filed and indexed to give notice.
159 See supra note 136; see also 94 A.L.R.2d 748 (2003) ("While the Internal Revenue Code
does not refer to choate and inchoate liens, the courts have held that a competing prior lien is
entitled to priority over a federal tax lien if the competing lien is choate when the federal lien
arises, but not if the competing lien is inchoate when the federal lien arises.").
160 Id. However, in the case of insolvency, the government's lien is granted specific priority.
See 31 U.S.C. § 4713(a) (2000). The federal lien has priority against a prior specific and perfected
lien in favor of a state or any other person. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
161 See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6321-1 (2000). ("The lien attaches to all property and rights to property
belonging to such person at any time during the period of the lien, including any property or rights
to property acquired by such person after the lien arises.").
162 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b).
163 A security interest means "any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of
securing payment or performance of an obligation or indemnifying against loss or liability." 26
U.S.C. § 6323(h)(1).
164 "A security interest exists at any time (A) if, at such time, the property is in existence and
the interest has become protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out
of an unsecured obligation, and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder has parted with
money or money's worth." Id.
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Although purchase money mortgages are not directly addressed by the
tax code, such mortgages are included in the term "security interest." 167 Apply-
ing this language, it would seem as though a purchase money mortgage, or any
mortgage, would be superior to a federal tax lien only in those situations where
when the purchase money mortgage came into existence, the holder of such
mortgage did not have any notice of the federal tax lien.
Digging further into congressional intent, however, Congress, when en-
acting the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,168 intended to preserve the priority of
the purchase money mortgage. 69 Specifically, Congress stated that:
It has generally been held that [purchase money mortgage] in-
terests are protected whenever they arise. This is based upon
the concept that the taxpayer has acquired property or a right to
property only to the extent that the value of the whole property
or right exceeds the amount of the purchase money mortgage.
This concept is not affected by the bill. In view of the legisla-
tive history of the [Act], the Internal Revenue Service will con-
sider that a purchase money security interest or mortgage valid
under local law is protected even though it may arise after a no-
tice of Federal tax lien has been filed. 170
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue recognizing that
"[d]ecisional law has long established that a purchase-money mortgagee's inter-
est in the mortgaged property is superior to antecedent liens prior in time."
171
Therefore, the Court reasoned that a "federal tax lien is subordinate to a pur-
chase-money mortgagee's interest notwithstanding that the agreement is made
165 For the purposes of the this statute, actual notice or knowledge occurs "in any event from
the time such fact would have been brought to such individual's attention if the organization had
exercised due diligence." 26 U.S.C. § 6323(i)(1). Due diligence occurs through reasonable rou-
tines regarded as regular duties used to communicate information to persons conducting a transac-
tion. Id. Thus, under this definition, constructive notice would be actual notice if the person
conducting a transaction would be normally required to uncover such information in his or her
regular course of business.
166 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(1)(B).
167 Minix v. Maggard, 652 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Ky. 1983).
168 The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000); see also 80 Stat.
1125 (1966).
169 Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 259 n.23 (1978).
170 Rev. Rule 68-57 n.1, 1968-1 C.B. 553 (1968) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No.
1884, at 817 (1966).
171 Slodov, 436 U.S. at 259 n.23.
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and the security interest arises after notice of the tax lien." 172 The Supreme
Court, in arriving at this conclusion, also recognized that Congress had acted to
preserve this priority when it enacted the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.173
Slodov, however, was a bankruptcy proceeding that did not expressly
involve purchase money priority. The discussion of priority was stated in dicta
to illustrate that the federal government's power to collect back taxes only ex-
tends to the extent of the taxpayer's interest in the property. 174 Thus, state law
determines a tax debtor's interest in the property, and the lien cannot attach
when the debtor has no interest. 175 Thus, the federal government's lien for un-
paid income taxes does not have priority over a purchase money mortgage re-
corded after the tax lien because the debtor had no interest in the subsequently
acquired property at the time the tax lien attached.
In Belland v. O.K. Lumber Co.,176 the Alaska Supreme Court directly
addressed the issue and applied the footnote in Slodov. Belland was an attorney
hired by the O.K. Lumber Co. to handle a real property transaction. 177 His cli-
ents later sued him for malpractice because he had recorded various documents,
including the deed of trust to secure the transaction, without discovering the
existence of a federal tax lien, which had been recorded after his title report to
his clients, but before the documents were recorded. 178 Belland contended that
his clients had suffered no damage, and were therefore not entitled to any relief,
because the deed of trust had priority over the federal tax lien as "it was in the
nature of a purchase-money mortgage."
7 9
The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, citing that when Congress enacted
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, it intended to preserve the priority of pur-
chase money mortgages.180 The court also reasserted the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation in Slodov,181 and held that the deed of trust was a pur-
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 257.
175 Id. at 259 n.19.
176 797 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1990).
177 Id. at 639.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 640. Like West Virginia, a deed of trust in Alaska is treated as a lien against the prop-
erty, much like a mortgage. Thus, a deed of trust that would constitute a purchase money mort-
gage shall be treated as such. See id. at n.4.
180 Id. at 640.
181 Id. at 641.
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chase money mortgage, and therefore, had priority over the federal tax lien.
182
V. WEST VIRGINIA STATE INCOME TAx LIENS AND PURCHASE MONEY
MORTGAGE PRIORITY
State tax liens operate much the same way as federal liens. Under West
Virginia law, failure to pay state income tax subjects the taxpayer to a lien on
the taxpayer's real and personal property. 183 Moreover, a tax lien is not valid as
against an innocent purchaser for value without notice until recorded. 184 There-
fore, no absolute priority exists in favor of the State's lien for unpaid income
taxes. As long as the lien has been properly recorded to give notice, the lien
would seem to fall under the "notice" principles of the West Virginia recording
statute.
Although purchase money mortgages are not expressly exempted from
the terms of West Virginia Code § 38-1 OC- 1, neither are purchase money mort-
gages expressly exempted from the recording statutes for transfers of real prop-
erty, judgment liens, or federal income tax liens. Yet, in each of those situa-
tions, the purchase money mortgage has priority; therefore, to then reject pur-
chase money priority as to antecedent state income tax liens would create
somewhat of an anomaly.
Furthermore, it has been held that "legal or equitable title to personal
property must be vested in the taxpayer before the State is entitled to enforce its
claim against said property to the prejudice of the seller."' 185 In Moran v. Lec-
cony Smokeless Coal Co, the State of West Virginia claimed its liens for unpaid
gross sales tax and consumer's sales tax had priority over all other liens against
the debtor.18 6 In assessing the State's claim as against certain creditors under
conditional sales contracts, where a balance of the purchase money was still due
on the property sold, Justice Fox noted the "inherent unfairness in subjecting the
property of one person to the obligation of another" and declined to adopt such a
harsh rule.
187
The court further held that that the creditors under these conditional
sales contracts were entitled to priority over the State's liens. 188 Justice Fox
182 Id. at 642.
183 See W. VA CODE § 11-10-12 (2004) (the statute requires that any tax due and payable under
this article "shall be a debt due this state. It shall be a personal obligation of the taxpayer and shall
be a lien upon the real and personal property of the taxpayer.").
t94 See W. VA. CODE § 38-10C- 1 (2004).
185 Moran v. Leccony Smokeless Coal Co., 10 S.E.2d 578, 582 (W. Va. 1940).
186 id. at 580.
187 Id. at 582.
188 Id. at 583.
20051
25
Ashton: Yes, West Virginia, There Is a Special Priority for the Purchase
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
stated that, "the seller of property ... in retaining title to the property sold, holds
a preference over all liens, other than the lien of a levy for property tax, which
may be created against the same in the hands of the purchaser, for the purchase
price of the property so sold."1
89
Even though Moran dealt directly with the sale of personal property, the
court's rationale is easily applicable to purchase money mortgages on real prop-
erty. First, just as Moran held that title to goods must be vested in the taxpayer
before it can be subjected to a lien in favor of the State, the same explanation
is given when a debtor obtains title to real estate, and at the same time gives a
deed of trust to either the seller or a third-party to secure the purchase money.191
In such cases, a prior judgment lien cannot attach because the purchaser never
obtains title to the land. 92 Thus, the judgment creditor can acquire no better
right to his debtor's estate than the debtor has.' 93 Given the holding of Moran
and the nature of the purchase money mortgage, the of West Virginia's lien for
unpaid income tax can only attach to title in property actually vested in the tax-
payer.
Second, Moran gave a seller of property under a conditional sales con-
tract a priority over all other liens, except for property taxes, created by the pur-
chaser.-194 This is essentially the theory behind purchase money priority.
195
Therefore, where one purchases property and gives a deed of trust for the pur-
chase money, the mortgagee's interest in the real property should be superior to
the State's lien for unpaid income tax by the mortgagor-purchaser. For West
Virginia to give priority to a vendor parting with personal property a superior
lien over the State's lien, but not permit a mortgagee holding under a purchase
money mortgage in real property to have the same priority would be an incon-
sistent application of the law. Thus, given the holdings of Moran and the nature
of the purchase money mortgage, once West Virginia formally adopts purchase
money priority, a purchase money mortgage should also be superior to an ante-
cedent income tax lien in favor of the State West Virginia.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have adopted,
in some way or another, the priority of the purchase money mortgage may lead
189 Id.
190 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
195 See supra Part It of this article.
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some practitioners to simply assume that West Virginia recognizes this same
principle. However, because no West Virginia law exists on the issue, the topic
of the priority would be left for interpretation based upon the specific facts of a
particular case.
Nonetheless, based upon the traditional notions of the priority, West
Virginia should follow the majority rule concerning purchase money mortgages.
West Virginia's Constitution, Code, and case law all clearly recognize that, un-
less changed by the legislature, West Virginia will apply the common law as it
existed in Virginia as of 1863. Both the common law of Virginia and England
recognize and apply purchase money priority; thus, in theory, West Virginia is
bound by those applications.
Moreover, West Virginia's own recording statutes were taken from, and
mirror, the recording statutes of Virginia. Just as purchase money priority was
uniformly applied in Virginia despite that fact that the Virginia statutes never
exempted purchase money mortgages from its "notice" requirement, the same
application logically follows for West Virginia to apply the same.
Pragmatically speaking, even if the traditional explanations are consid-
ered "legal fiction" when regarding third-party lenders, the intrinsic fairness
idea that lenders loan money with the expectation of having a lien on the real
estate being acquired that is superior to any other interest is a sufficient explana-
tion. Specifically, but for the loan, the mortgagor would have never received the
property. In the modem era of numerous and complex real estate transactions,
the rule encourages purchase money financing by reducing potential errors in
title examinations.
Thus, once a purchase money mortgage has priority over antecedent
judgment liens arising through the mortgagor, this same priority is specifically
provided to it over antecedent federal income tax liens and logically to it over
antecedent West Virginia state income tax liens. So yes, West Virginia, the
principle of providing a special priority for the purchase money mortgage does
exist in the Mountain State.
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